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Illusory Ethics: Legal Barriers to an
Ombudsman's Compliance with
Accepted Ethical Standards
By Scott C. Van Soyel
Americans don't trust their governments. A 1997 survey of urban
Philadelphia residents by the Pew Research Center for the People and the
Press showed that ninety percent of respondents didn't trust government at
any level.' This is disturbing because citizens with low trust in government
are generally less law-abiding than their trusting counterparts.2
Furthermore, they feel less able to affect events in their community, and are
less likely to engage in civic affairs. 3
Such feelings are not confined to a particular political party, community,
or administration. The Philadelphia study's authors indicate that their results
mirror those across the nation. 4 Similar attitudes of distrust and skepticism
toward government have persisted since the Vietnam War, with the
exception of a brief period of strong support for the Bush administration
after the attack on the World Trade Center.5 While some scholars argue that

Scott C. Van Soye is a 1988 graduate of the UCLA School of Law. He is also a member of the
Class of 2007 at Pepperdine's Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution. He actively litigated in
California courts from 1988-1998, and served as Judicial Staff Counsel to the judges of the San
Bernardino Superior Court from 1998-2006, advising them on literally thousands of civil cases. He
now uses this broad experience as a principal in Pacific Coast Dispute Resolution, which provides
mediation, arbitration, and reference services to those involved in civil disputes at the trial and
appellate level.
1. PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS, TRUST AND CITIZEN
ENGAGEMENT IN METROPOLITAN PHILADELPHIA: A CASE STUDY (1997), http://peoplepress.org/reports/display.php3?ReportlD=l 10, (last visited Oct. 18, 2007).
2. Timothy E. Cook & Paul Gronke, The Skeptical American: Revisiting the Meanings of
Trust in Government and Confidence in Institutions, 67 J. POL. 784, 785 n.1 (2005).
3. Cook & Gronke, supra note 2, at 786 n.l.
4. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 1.
5. PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS, PUBLIC OPINION SIX MONTHS
LATER: NATIONHOOD, INTERNATIONALISM LIFTED (2002), http://people-press.org/commentary//
display.php3?AnalysislD=44 (last visited Oct. 19, 2007).
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this data shows merely skepticism and not active distrust, 6 the net result is

the same - dissatisfaction with the government, and a belief that it must be
monitored. 7 The situation in the private sector is similar. An ABC News
poll found that in the face of repeated corporate scandals, only 11% of

Americans trust corporate executives, 8 and only 18% trust even published

corporate financial statements. 9
One method of combating such beliefs is the introduction of an

ombudsman,' 0 or "citizen's defender,"" into the
corporate13 system. An "ombudsman" is a person who
about improprieties and systemic problems within his
and investigates or otherwise addresses these issues
impartially. 14

governmental 12 or
receives complaints
defined jurisdiction
independently and

There are five general types of ombudsmen: classical, executive,

corporate, educational, and newspaper.
by governmental entities,

16

5

The first two types are appointed

while the last three are associated with private

organizations. "

6. Cook & Gronke, supra note 2, at 800-01.
7. Id. at 784.
8. Stephen Ruckman, A Matter of Expression: How Trusted Communication Leads to Trusted
Boards, CORP. GOVERNANCE, Oct. 2004, at 25, 33 n. 1.
9. Ruckman, supra note 8, at n.3.
10. The term ombudsman is used here in a gender-neutral sense. The author recognizes the
valuable contributions of women to this field. In using the male form neutrally, the author follows
the lead of other writers in this area. See e.g. SAM ZAGORIA, THE OMBUDSMAN: How GOOD
GOVERNMENTS HANDLE CITIZENS' COMPLAINTS 3 (1988). This is also the practice followed by the
International Ombudsman Association (IOA) on its website. International Ombudsman Association,
http://www.ombudsassociation.org/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2007). It is also expressly adopted by the
United States Ombudsman Association (USOA) in its standards. UNITED STATES OMBUDSMAN
ASSOCIATION,

GOVERNMENT

OMBUDSMAN

STANDARDS

I

n. 1

(2003),

http://www.usombudsman.org/documents/PDF/References/USOASTANDARDS.pdf.
11. Alfred Bexelius, The Origin, Nature, and Functions of the Civil and Military Ombudsmen
in Sweden, 377 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 10 (1968).
12. Id.
13. See Ruckman, supra note 8, at n.3.
14. See Christine M. Kuta, Comment, Universities, Corporations,And States Use Them-Now
it's Time to Protect Them: An Analysis of the Public and Private Sector Ombudsman and the
ContinuedNeed Fora PrivilegedRelationship,27 S.ILL. U. L. J. 389, 393 (2003).
15. See infra notes 23-83 and accompanying text.
16. ZAGORIA, supra note 10, at 37-38. Zagoria also refers to a "citizen" ombudsman on pp.
38-40, appointed by a commission but funded by the government. Id. at 38-40. However, he does
not discuss to whom the citizen ombudsman reports, what authority he or she has, or under what
circumstances he or she can be dismissed. Id. Therefore, it is unclear whether this type is
functionally distinguishable from those already named.
17. See infra notes 62 (educational ombudsmen), 71-72 (organizational ombudsman), and 79
(newspaper ombudsmen).
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The American Bar Association has identified a sixth type of
ombudsman, the advocate, whose responsibility it is to protect a vulnerable
population, such as children or residents of long-term care facilities. 18 But
because the advocate ombudsman is appointed by the government, he or she
is either a legislative or an executive ombudsman, and there is no reason to
create a separate category. 19
As the ombudsman concept has spread, professional organizations have
formed to support practitioners.2 °Ethics and standards of practice have been
accepted by those in the field. 21 Unfortunately, these ethical standards will
not withstand the realities of litigation in California. Even in jurisdictions
where a general legislative ombudsman has been adopted, legal pitfalls
inherent in the accepted ethical standards are so serious that strict
compliance would land an ombudsman in serious trouble.2 1
So, what's an ethical ombudsman to do?
After reviewing the
characteristics of each type of ombudsman and identifying the legal and
practical barriers to ethical compliance, this article will consider what claims
of privilege or methods of practice will allow maximum ethical practice with
minimum exposure to legal penalties, and will offer tips for moving forward.

I. THE FIVE TYPES OF OMBUDSMEN
A. The ClassicalOmbudsman
A "classical," or "legislative," ombudsman exists to ensure that the
government follows the law, rendering fair and impartial administrative
decisions. He or she is appointed by the legislature to investigate citizen
reports of governmental abuse. 23 They may also initiate investigations on

18. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA STANDARDS FOR ESTABLISHMENT AND
OPERATION OF OMBUDS OFFICES (2004), http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/
AL322500/newsletterpubs/i 15.pdf(last visited Oct. 18, 2007).
19. The ABA Standards do not discuss newspaper ombudsmen.

See AMERICAN BAR

ASSOCIATION, supra note 18.

20. See supra notes 15-16.
21. See generally International Ombudsman Association and United States Ombudsman
Association, supra note 10 (the Standards of the IOA and the USOA); see also AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, supra note 18 (the ABA Standards).

22.
23.

See infra notes 170-196 and accompanying text.
ZAGORIA, supra note 8, at 37-38.

119
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their own.24 Generally, the ombudsman is appointed for a defined term,
reports directly to the legislature, and is neutral.2

5

The classical ombudsman has broad access to governmental employees

and agency records, and is given subpoena powers.26

They may resolve

investigations informally (by persuading the appropriate official to change

course) or formally (by publishing reports to the legislature 27). Rowe and
Gottehrer 28 assert that the identity of one who complains to a classical
ombudsman is statutorily confidential, 29 but as we shall see this is not
always true.

The modem use of the classical ombudsman began in Sweden in 1809, 30
in response to abuses by King Gustaf Ill.31 The office still exists today, and
is part of the Swedish Constitution, or Regerinsformen.32 Unlike American
ombudsmen, the Swedish official may act as a public prosecutor in cases of
corruption or malfeasance. 33 Five American states (Alaska,34 Arizona,35

legislative ombudsmen
on
Hawaii, 36 Iowa 37 and Nebraska 38) have general 39
40
the Swedish model, as do the Territories of Guam

and Puerto Rico.

24. Dean M. Gottehrer & Mary P. Rowe, Similarities and Differences between Public and
Private Sector Ombudsmen (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with ABA, Section of
and
Regulatory
Practice), http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/ombuds/
Administrative
Law
g&rsimilar.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2007).
25. Dean M. Gottehrer & Michael Hostina, Essential Characteristics of a Classical
Ombudsman 2-3 (1998), http://www.usombudsman.org/documents/PDF/References/Essential.PDF
(last visited Oct. 18, 2007).
26. Id. at 7.
27. Id. at 5.
28. See Gottehrer & Rowe, supra note 24.
29. See id.
30. Bexelius, supra note 11, at 11.
31. See THE PARLIAMENTARY OMBUDSMAN, The ParliamentaryOmbudsman - JO, Oct. 30,
2006, http://www.jo.se/Page.aspx?Menuld=1 2&ObjectClass=DynamX-Documents&Language=en
(last visited Oct. 18, 2007).
OMBUDSMAN,
The Instrument of Government
32. See THE PARLIAMENTARY
(Regeringsformen), Oct. 12, 2004,
http://www.jo.se/Page.aspx?Menuld=37&MainMenuld=2&Language=en&ObjectClass=DynamX
Document&ld=571 (last visited Oct. 18, 2007).
33. See id.
34. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 24.55.010-.340 (2006).
35. See ARiZ. REV. STAT. §§ 41-1371 to-1383 (2007).
36. See HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 96-2 to -19 (LexisNexis 2006).
37. See IOWA CODE §§ 2c.1 -19 (2007).
38. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-8,240 to -8,254 (2006).
39. See GUAM CODE ANN. tit. 2 §§ 5101-5120 (2006).
40. See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 2 §§ 710-727 (2004).
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B. The Executive Ombudsman
An "executive" ombudsman serves the same function as a legislative
one, but is appointed by a government head, such as a mayor or governor,
and serves at his or her pleasure. 41 At least thirteen states have general
executive ombudsmen serving as part of the Governor's office .42
The federal government has created executive ombudsmen regarding a
number of agencies and topics. 43 While these offices are established by
statute, they are executive because the ombudsmen generally are appointed
by and report to agency heads, rather than to Congress."
Similarly, many states have statutorily-created executive ombudsmen
concerning specialized topics, especially children,45 small business,
corrections, and injured workers. California has executive ombudsmen
48
covering mobile homes, 46 small business, 47 teachers' retirement, long-term

41. EXECUTIVE OMBUDSMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (Alan J. Wyner, ed., 1973).
42. These states are Colorado, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New
Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin, according to the
author's informal survey of gubernatorial websites.
43. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 1211 (2007) (Merit Systems Protection Board); 6 U.S.C.A. § 232 (2007)
(immigration); 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 2304b, 2350h (2007) (military procurement); I I U.S.C.A. §§ 332,
333 (2007) (bankruptcy); 12 U.S.C.A. § 4806(d) (2007) (banking); 15 U.S.C.A. § 657 (2007)
(construction contracts); 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 657(b), 657b (b)(2), 2652 (2007) (SBA); 20 U.S.C.A. §
1018(o (2007) (student loans); 22 U.S.C.A. § 290m-2(c) (2007) (community investment); 22
U.S.C.A. §2664a(c) (2007) (civil service); 22 U.S.C.A. § 5506(c) (2007) (international aviation
disasters); 24 U.S.C.A. § 417(g) (2007) (military hospital); 26 U.S.C.A. §7802 (2007) (IRS); 36
U.S.C.A. §220509(b) (2007) (Olympic athletes); 41 U.S.C.A. § 253j (2007) (civil procurement); 42
U.S.C.A. § 1395b-9(c)(2) (2007) (Medicare); 42 U.S.C.A. § 3058g (2007) (long-term care); 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 6908, 6917 (2007) (solid waste disposal); 42 U.S.C.A. § 7261c (2007) (technology
partnerships); 42 U.S.C.A. § 7385s-15 (2007) (energy employees occupational illnesses); 49
U.S.C.A. § 106(q) (2007) (aircraft noise); and 49 U.S.C.A. § 60133 (2007) (pipeline repairs).
44. The one possible exception is the special counsel to the Merit Systems Protection Board,
who is appointed by the President for a five year term with the advice and consent of the Senate, and
who reports to both the President and Congress. 5 U.S.C.A. § 1211 (b) (2007); 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 12171218 (2007). Further, the special counsel may subpoena witnesses and begin litigation - powers of
legislative ombudsmen. 5 U.S.C.A. § 1212 (2007). Finally, while the President may remove the
special counsel, the grounds for removal are limited to "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance
in office." 5 U.S.C.A. § 1211(b) (2007). The special counsel is therefore a hybrid ombudsman,
sharing characteristics of both executive and legislative types.
45. See Office of Children's Ombudsman, https://www.michigan.gov/oco/0,1607,7-13311755-,00.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2007), for a listing of American children's ombudsmen.
46. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §18151 (West 2007).
47. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11148 (West 2007).
48. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 22302 (West 2007).
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care,49 child care, 50 prison sexual abuse,5' foster care,52 and workers'
compensation insurance. 53 Like the federal ombudsmen discussed above,
these ombudsmen are responsible to agency heads rather than the legislature.
Executive
ombudsmen's offices also exist in cities and counties across the
54
country.
Some theorists argue that executive ombudsmen are generally less
effective than classical ones, because they serve at the pleasure of the
executive, and because their term of office usually ends with the appointing
executive's departure. 5' Also, such ombudsmen usually
lack subpoena
56
powers, though the appointing official may have them.
A critical part of any ombudsman's value is his or her independence
from the appointing authority.5 7 The executive ombudsman's claim of
independence may lack credibility, given his susceptibility to pressure from
above.58 Indeed, such ombudsmen are sometimes accused of whitewashing
governmental corruption,59 or of existing mainly to do political "casework"
for the appointing executive.6 °
But this weakness - the executive ombudsman's perceived close ties to
the appointing official - is also his greatest strength. In the absence of
lower-level managerial cooperation, the ombudsman can go straight to the
top to complain, and be heard. In practice, the executive ombudsman's

49. CAL. WELFARE. & INST. CODE § 9710 (West 2007).
50. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1596.872(a) (West 2007).
51. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2641 (West 2007).
52. CAL. WELFARE. & INST. CODE § 16160 (West 2007).
53. CAL. INS. CODE § 11752.6(g) (West 2007).
54. See ZAGORIA, supra note 10, at 73-74.
55. See id. at 39-40.
56. See Stanley V. Anderson, Comparing Classicaland Executive Ombudsmen, in EXECUTIVE
OMBUDSMAN IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 41, at 311-12; see also Michael Mills, Municipal
Government Ombudsman, UNITED STATES OMBUDSMAN ASSOCIATION, Sept. 23, 1994,
http://www.usombudsman.org/en/references/more-references/municipal govemment_ombudsman.c
fm (last visited Oct. 18, 2007).
57. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 18.
58. See ZAGORIA, supra note 10, at 38-41; see also Anderson, supra note 56, at 311; see also
Larry B. Hill, Letter to American Bar Association President Martha W. Barnett, UNITED STATES
OMBUDSMAN ASSOCIATION, July 20, 2001, http://www.usombudsman.org/documents/MSWord/
References/ABA/Hill.doe (last visited Oct. 19, 2007) (dissenting from the Committee's Report to the
House of Delegates of the Standards for the Establishment and Operation of Ombudsman Offices).
59. Phillip J. Hannon, The Nassau County Ombudsman, in EXECUTIVE OMBUDSMEN INTHE
UNITED STATES, supra note 41, at 111, 121-23.
60. See Hill, supra note 58.
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independence is generally fostered and respected by those who appoint
him. 6'
C. The EducationalOmbudsman
Universities and colleges and have made extensive use of ombudsmen
since 1966, when Michigan State University and Eastern Montana College
both established ombudsmen to hear student and faculty complaints
occurring in the face of student unrest. 62 The concept spread rapidly after
the Kent State massacre of 1970,63 as a way to provide students with a way
to express their frustrations, a "safety valve" that would prevent more
violent confrontations. 64
Today, there are more than 300 college and university ombudsmen in
the United States. 65 They address problems affecting students, faculty and
staff, including grading and discipline issues, personnel problems, and

Professor Larry Hill notes that most educational
tenure decisions.
mediators, rather than conducting investigations to
function
as
ombudsmen

ensure that university or college standards have been followed,67 as a
classical ombudsman would do. Robert Shelton 68 confirms this observation,
noting that he began a campus mediation service while serving as an
ombudsman at the University of Kansas. However, Shubert & Folger 69 note

61. See Anderson, supra note 56; see also Mills, supra note 56. The United Sates
Ombudsman Association also recognizes these weaknesses at sections II(A)(1)(c) and II(A)(2)(c) of
its standards; see Cook & Gronke, supra note 2.
62. Shirley A. Wiegand, A Just and Lasting Peace: Supplanting Mediation with the Ombuds
Model, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISPUTE RESOL. 95, 113 (1996).

63. Wiegand, supra note 62, at 113-14.
64. Paul Hobson-Panico et al., Can Ombudsmen Influence Organization Effectiveness
Through the Practiceof Campus Ecology? CAMPUS ECOLOGIST (IND. STATE UNIV., TERRE HAUTE,
IND.), 1985, http://www.campusecologist.org/cen/v3n4.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2007).
65. Luigi Cominelli, Dawn of a New Profession: The Evolving Practiceof the Organizational
Ombudsman 3, http://www.lawandsocietysummerinstitutes.org/workshopO5/paper4/Cominelli.rtf
(last visited Oct. 19, 2007).
66. See Office of the Ombudsman, Michigan State University, What is an Ombudsman?,
http://www.msu.edu/unit/
ombud/what.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2007).
67. Hill, supranote 58.
68. Robert L. Shelton, The Institutional Ombudsman: a University Case Study, 16
NEGOTIATION J. 81, 92 (2000).

69. J. Janelle Shubert & Joseph P. Folger, Learningfrom Higher Education, 2 NEGOTIATION J.
395, 397 (1986).
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that many universities also incorporate an adjudicative component into the
process, in hopes of minimizing intervention by the courts.
Shelton identifies the ideal characteristics of an educational ombudsman
as "community experience" (that is, time spent in both teaching and
administration), tenure (which carries with it independence), confidentiality,
and experience with dispute resolution.7°
D. The CorporateOmbudsman

A fourth use of the concept is the corporate ombudsman. His function is
to resolve problems with customers and employees, and to spot trends that

may indicate failures of policy.7

One study found that approximately ten

percent of responding corporations surveyed had ombudsmen on staff,72 and
the American Bar Association states that over 1,000 U.S. corporations
employ ombudsmen. "
Corporate ombudsmen are generally outside the organizational
hierarchy; they serve at the pleasure of the board, president or chairman of
the corporation. 7 4 They therefore suffer from the same weaknesses as an
appointed executive ombudsman - susceptibility to executive pressure or
changes in leadership, and a resulting lack of credibility among the corporate
rank and file. 75
For example, although Rowe and Hicks emphasize that the corporate
ombudsman must be perceived as independent to be useful ,76 Fox and
Stallworth found that only a third of employees who complained of
workplace bullying supported the use of an ombudsman.77 They suggest

70. Shelton, supranote 68, at 83, 92.
71. JAMES T. ZIEGENFUSS, JR., ORGANIZATIONAL TROUBLESHOOTERS 94-96 (1988). See also
Mary P. Rowe & Wilbur Hicks, The OrganizationalOmbuds, in RESOURCE BOOK FOR MANAGING
EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES 8 (2004), available at http://www.cpradr.org/pdfs/RoweHicks_.
Ombuds.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2007). Rowe and Hicks state that as much as a third of the
corporate ombudsman's time is spent in this policy-changing function. Id. at 7.
72. Jessica Oser, Note, The Unguided Use of Internal ADR Programs to Resolve Sexual
HarassmentControversiesin the Workplace, 6 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 283, 295 n.80 (2005).
73. Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Ombudsman Offices in the Federal Government-An Emerging
available
at
NEWS
(1997),
&
REG.
L.
ABA
ADMIN.
Trend?,
22
http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/news/vol22no4/ombudsmn.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2007).
74. Rowe & Hicks, supra note 71, at 3.
75. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
76. Rowe & Hicks, supra note 71, at 4-5.
77. Suzy Fox & Lamont E. Stallworth, Employee Perceptions of Internal Conflict
Management Programs and ADR Processesfor Preventing and Resolving Incidents of Workplace
Bullying: Ethical Challengesfor Decision-Makers in Organizations,8 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J.
375, 400 (2004).
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that employees distrust corporate ombudsmen because of their perceived ties
to upper management. 78

These ties are emphasized by the practice of giving the ombudsman an
elevated place in the corporate hierarchy, 79 though in theory he or she is

supposed to exist outside of it.
E. The Newspaper Ombudsman

A special type of corporate ombudsman, or "public editor," is seen in
some newspapers.

Rather than addressing problems with employees or

customers, however, the newspaper ombudsman addresses issues of

"accuracy, fairness, balance and good taste in news coverage. 8 °
The idea began in Japan in 1922, and spread to the United States in
1967.81 But by 2003, less than forty of the United States' 1,500 daily
newspapers had ombudsmen.8 2 Critics like Matt Welch argue that the

ombudsman can do nothing to improve accuracy that a responsive
newspaper staff would not do on its own.83 However, others argue that news
ombudsmen increase
accuracy, fairness and accountability, save time, and
84
reduce lawsuits.

II.

THE ETHICAL STANDARDS

College and university ombudsmen formed their own professional
association, the University and College Ombudsmen Association (UCOA),

78. Id.
79. Professor Victor Futter defines a corporate ombudsman as a "senior official" in his article.
Victor Futter, It's Time for a Corporate Ombudsperson, 10 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF
LITIGATION 76, 76-77 (1992). As an example, McDonald's' national ombudsman is a vicepresident. See Ron Hawkins: Vice President and National Ombudsman, EBONY, Dec. 2004,
availableat http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m 1077/is_2_60/
aijn7577915/pg-l (last visited Oct. 19, 2007).
80. Organization of News Ombudsmen, What is ONO?, http://www.newsombudsmen.org/
what.htm (last visited October 19, 2007).
81. Id.
82. Matt Welch, Anything but the Ombudsman! Why Newspapers Should Avoid In-House
Watchdogs, REASON, Aug. 2003, availableat http://www.reason.com/news/show/28860.html.
83. Id. As Welch puts it: "[h]iring a public editor is like advertising your monopolist
indifference and staffing bloat .... Id.
84. George Claassen, Why Ethics Matter, in CHANGING THE FOURTH ESTATE: ESSAYS IN
SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNALISM 135-37 (Adrian Hadland ed., 2006).
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in the late 1990s 5 and published their own ethical standards shortly
thereafter.8 6 Likewise, a group of corporate ombudsmen formed The
Ombudsman Association (TOA) in 1992.8 TOA also promulgated its own
code of ethics.88
Although the Organization of News Ombudsmen was formed in 1980,.8
its members have not propounded a separate code of ethics. Presumably,
they adhere to reporter's ethics, which (as relevant here) provide that the
identity of confidential informants shall be kept confidential, and that
newsmen will not testify to those identities. 90
In 2005, the UCOA merged with TOA to form the International
Ombudsman Association ("IOA").9' The IOA professes the following
ethical principles: (1) IOA members shall be independent to the greatest
extent possible; (2) IOA members are neutral, and do not engage in conflicts
of interest; (3) IOA members keep all communications confidential, except
where there is consent to disclosure or an imminent risk of harm; (4) IOA
members will
not participate in formal adjudicative or administrative
92
proceedings.
IOA's Standards of Practice 93 flesh out these principles, providing in
part:
0 That communications with the ombudsman are kept
confidential and that94confidentiality may be maintained even in
the face of a waiver.

85. See International Ombudsman Association, http://www.ombudsassociation.org/ (last
visited Oct. 19, 2007).
86. University
and
College
Ombuds
Association,
Standards of Practice,
http://www.colorado.edu/Ombuds/UCOA/
SOP.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2007) (for a copy of the UCOA's ethical standards, later superseded
by those of the IOA).
87. Diversity
Best
Practices,
Additional Ethics-Related Resources, at
789,
http://www.diversitybestpractices.com/pdf/r-ethics04/add.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2007).
88. The
Ombudsman
Association,
Code
of
Ethics
(1995),
http://web.mit.edu/negotiation/toa/TOAcoe.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2007) (for a copy of TOA's
ethical standards, later superseded by those of the IOA).
89. See What is ONO?, supra note 80.
90. See Claassen, supra note 84, at 138; see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 732, n.10
(1972) (Stewart, J. dissenting).
91. See
International
Ombudsman
Association,
IOA
Code
of
Ethics,
http://www.ombudsassociation.org/standards/CodeEthics-l -07.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2007).
92. See id.
93. See International
Ombudsman
Association,
IOA Standards
of Practice,
http://www.ombudsassociation.org/standards/StdsPractice-1-07.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
94. See id. at § 3.1.
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*

That communications with the ombudsman are subject to a
privilege, which is held by the ombudsman. 95

"

That the ombudsman does not testify in internal proceedings,
as
and will resist testifying in external proceedings such
96
litigation, even if given permission or requested to do SO.

*

That no records containing identifying information are kept by
the ombudsman on behalf of the organization. 9'

*

That any records will be kept secure, and will be subject to a
document destruction policy. 98

*

That notice to
organization.99

the ombudsman

is

not notice

to

the

Like the IOA, the United States Ombudsman Association (USOA),
which represents governmental ombudsmen, has published standards
promoting independence, impartiality, confidentiality, and the credibility of
the review process. ' 00 These standards emphasize that the ombudsman is
neutral, and represents neither complainant nor agency.l 0' They assert that
the ombudsman should not be subject to testimonial compulsion,10 2 should
have discretion to offer confidentiality to participants, 103 and that records of
the proceedings should also be confidential.'04
Unlike the IOA Standards,'0 5 however, the USOA Standards recognize
that their confidentiality principles may be subject to legal limits. 10 6 They

95. See id. at § 3.2.
96. See id. at § 3.3.
97. See id. at § 3.5.
98. See id. at § 3.6.
99. See id. at § 3.8.
100. See United States Ombudsman Association, Government Ombudsman Standards,
http://www.usombudsman.org/documents/PDF/References/USOA STANDARDS.pdf (last visited
Oct. 19, 2007).
101. Seeid. at § 1l(B)(5)(a).
102. See id. at § ll(C)(3)(a).
103. See id. at § II(C). The USOA refers to confidentiality as a "tool," to be offered or withheld
at the ombudsman's discretion. Id.

104.
105.

See id. at §§ (A)(8)(d)-(e).
See IOA Standards of Practice, supra note 93.
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do not insist that confidentiality be maintained at all costs, and do not call

for the systematic destruction of records.' 07
III. LEGAL BARRIERS TO ETHICAL PRACTICE.

A. The States and the "Ombudsman Privilege"

Both the IOA and the USOA argue that communications with the
ombudsman are privileged, although the USOA's standards 08
make the
privilege discretionary with the ombudsman, rather than absolute.
California case law' 0 9 specifically rejects an ombudsman privilege,

based on California Evidence Code section 911, which provides that all
privileges against testimony or disclosure of information are statutory. 10
California has no general privilege statute relating to ombudsmen."' Where
there is no statutory or constitutional
basis for a privilege, California courts
2
have rejected its creation. "1
In fact, no American state or territory - including those where a general
legislative ombudsman exists"' - embraces the ombudsman privilege as
envisioned by either the IOA or by the USOA. 114
B. Differing State and TerritorialApproaches to Privilege
Those jurisdictions with some statutory reference to an ombudsman's
privilege use widely divergent approaches. Alaska" 5 and Hawaii' 16 require
the ombudsman to keep all matters and witness identities confidential.

106. See Government Ombudsman Standards, supranote 100, at § ll(C)(l)(b).
107. See id.
108. See id. at § II(C); see also IOA Standards of Practice, supra note 93, at §§ 3.1-3.8.
109. Saeta v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 4th 261, 273 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); see also
Ombudsman Serv. of N. Cal. v. Superior Court, 154 Cal. App. 4th 1233, 1243 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
110. CAL. EVID. CODE §911 (2006).
Except as otherwise provided by statute: (a) No person has a privilege to refuse to be a
witness; (b) No person has a privilege to refuse to disclose any matter or to refuse to
produce any writing, object, or other thing; (c) No person has a privilege that another
shall not be a witness or shall not disclose any matter or shall not produce any writing,
object, or other thing.
Id.
111. See generally id. at §§ 911-1128 (2006) (concerning privileges).
112. Am. Airlines v. Superior Court, 114 Cal. App.4th 881, 887 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
113. See supra notes 17-21 (Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Iowa and Nebraska).
114. See infra notes 115-25.
115. ALASKA STAT. § 24.55.160(b) (2006).
116. HAW. REV. STAT. § 96-9(b) (LexisNexis 2006).
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Iowa 1 7 and Guam"' permit, but apparently do not require, confidentiality.
Iowa Code Section 2C.8 provides that "[tihe citizens' aide may maintain
secrecy in respect to all matters including the identities of the complainants
or witnesses coming before the citizens' aide. . ."19 Title 2 of the Guam
Code Annotated contains almost identical language, granting the
ombudsman (known as the suruhanu) the power - but apparently not the
duty - to maintain secrecy. 120

Arizona requires

the ombudsman to keep witnesses'

identities

confidential if they so request. 2 1 The Nebraska Code lacks a confidentiality
provision. 122
Four states (Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, and Nebraska) grant the
ombudsman an express privilege not to testify. 123 It is unclear whether the
Iowa or Guam statutes that grant those legislative ombudsmen the power to
"maintain secrecy" would be interpreted as a testimonial privilege. 2 4 No

case from either jurisdiction addresses the issue. Puerto Rico's ombudsman
125

statutes neither grant any privilege nor address the confidentiality issue.
Despite their differing approaches, these statutes have one thing in
common: Across the United States and its territories, any existing
testimonial privileges apply to the ombudsman alone, not to claimants or
witnesses. 126 Assuming that witnesses' identities
27 were somehow disclosed
in litigation, they would have to testify in court. 1

117. IOWA CODE § 2C.8 (2007) (Emphasis added).
118. GUAM CODE ANN. tit. 2 § 5111(h) (2006).
119. IOWA CODE, supra note 117. However, the remainder of ICA §2C.8 gives the Governor
and the General Assembly complete access to the ombudsman's files. Id.
120. GUAM CODE ANN., supra note 118. "The suruhanu shall have the following powers...
(h) to maintain secrecy in respect to all matters and the identities of the complainants or witnesses
coming before him." Id.
121. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1378(F) (2007).
122. See generally NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-8,420 to 81-8,253 (concerning the duties of the
Public Counsel (i.e., the ombudsman)).
123. See ALASKA STAT. § 24.55.260 (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1380(C) (2007); HAW.
REV. STAT. §96-9(b) (LexisNexis 2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,253 (2006).
124. See supra notes 116, 119 and accompanying text.
125. See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 2, §§ 701-725 (2004).
126. See supra notes 115-125 and accompanying text.
127. See IOWA CODE § 2C.8 (2007); see also GUAM CODE ANN. tit. 2 § 511 1(h) (2006). It is
possible to interpret the vague language of the Iowa and Guam statutes, which grants the
ombudsman the power to "maintain secrecy," as including a privilege to prevent other participants
from testifying. Id. There is no authority on point, however. Id.

129
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Even Sweden, the birthplace of the modem ombudsman, imposes

secrecy on ombudsmen's proceedings only where1 28"considerable harm" to
the state or private citizens would otherwise result.
C. The Federal Courts and the Ombudsman Privilege
Federal courts have rarely recognized a common-law privilege for

employee communications with a corporate ombudsman. The first to do so
was the District Court of Connecticut, in the unpublished case of
MonoranjanRoy v. United Technologies.129 The only published federal case
supporting the privilege is Kientzy v. McDonnell Douglas Corp, 30 which
follows Roy. 131
Kientzy relies on section 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence in

recognizing an ombudsman's privilege.1 32 Rule 501 allows federal courts to
recognize new privileges based on common law principles, applying the

court's "reason and experience," on a case-by-case basis. 13

In deciding whether to find a privilege, the courts generally consider
three factors: "(1) whether important private and public interests would be
served by recognition of the privilege; (2) whether the evidentiary cost of
recognizing the privilege is likely to be modest; and (3) whether similar
protections are 34 afforded by the states, either through legislation or the

common law." 1
While the first two factors must be evaluated on an individualized basis,
the previous discussion shows that the third criterion will weigh against the

recognition 35of the privilege, since the states do not embrace a similar
protection. 1

128. See 11 ch. 4 § Sekretesslagen (1980:100), available at http://www.jo.se/Page.aspx?
Menuld=37&MainMenuld= I2&Language=en&ObjectClass-DynamX_Document&ld=576.
129. Monoranjan Roy v. United Technologies, (D.CT H-89-680) (May 29, 1990). Although
Roy is unpublished, it has been cited and discussed by succeeding cases and articles on the subject of
the ombudsman privilege. See, e.g., Kientzy v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 133 F.R.D. 570, 572-73
(E.D. Mo. 1991); Carman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 114 F.3d 790, 794 n.3 (8th Cir., 1997).
130. Kientzy, 133 F.R.D at 571-73.
131. Kientzy also relied on Shabazz v. Scurr, 662 F.Supp. 90 (S.D. Iowa 1987) to support the
creation of an ombudsman's privilege. But the court's reliance on Shabazz was misplaced. That
opinion established a limited governmental privilege, held by the state. Id. at 92-93. The privilege
was based on an expert witness' former employment as a state prison ombudsman, not on
participants' rights to confidentiality. See id. at 90-91.
132. Kientzy, 133 F.R.D. at 571-73.
133. Fed. Evid. R. 501 (2007).
134. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1118 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (citing Jaffee v.
Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10-15 (1996)).
135. See supra notes 115-127 and accompanying text.

130
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The District Court in Kientzy reasoned that the ombudsman privilege
should be upheld on the facts before it, because: (1) the participants believed
their communications would be confidential; (2) confidentiality is essential
to the ombudsman's function; (3) the relationship between the ombudsman
and process participants is worthy of societal support given McDonnell
Douglas' status as an important federal contractor; and (4) the potential
damage to McDonnell Douglas' ombudsman program 36
outweighed the
possible benefit that discovery might confer on the litigants.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit' 37 rejected Kientzy's
rationale and denied the privilege in Carman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp, a
case involving the same corporate program.'
Carman asserted that the
program's proficiency at resolving workplace disputes had not been shown,
that even without a privilege, the ombudsman could offer to keep employee
communications confidential from management, and that employees would
fear disclosure despite promises of confidentiality and regardless of any
privilege. '9
Only two post-Carman federal cases discuss the ombudsman
privilege. 140 Both flatly state that there is no such privilege under federal
law. 14' Though neither is binding, both indicate that a future claim of
privilege stands a poor chance of success in the federal courts.

136. Kientzy, 133 F.R.D at 570-72.
137. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit encompasses the District Courts that decided
both Kientzy and Shabazz. See supra notes 127-29.
138. Carman, 114 F.3d at 793-94.
139. See Fox and Stallworth, supra note 77 (discussion of the existence of such fears).
140. See Miller v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 188 F.3d. 518 (10"h Cir.1999), 1999 WL
506520; see also Solorzano v. Shell Oil Co., 2000 WL 1145766 (Aug. 14, 2000).
141. The unpublished decision in Miller expressly states: "we affirm the district court's ruling
regarding the ombudsman privilege. It is clear that neither Colorado law nor federal law, including
the decisions of this circuit, recognize an ombudsman privilege." See id. at 15. The District Court in
Solorzano relied on the Eighth Circuit's decision in Carman in refusing to recognize a federal
ombudsman privilege, saying at page 6 of its decision:
The Eighth Circuit in Carman appears to be the only appellate court to have considered whether to
create a federal ombudsman's privilege. The Court's reasons for rejecting the proposed privilege are
persuasive... I am particularly reluctant to recognize such a privilege as a matter of federal common
law when a narrowly drawn protective order of the type included later herein, short of recognition of
a broad-ranging privilege, will suffice to accommodate any need for confidentiality of the records
that might be responsive to plaintiff's discovery request.
Id. at 6.
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Because such claims are evaluated on a case-by-case basis, however, it
is possible that the privilege may yet be granted on a strong enough.factual
showing, though practitioners should prepare for its denial.
D. Confidentiality
In addition to the IOA's (erroneous) claim that communications with the
ombudsman are privileged, 142 both the 10A 143 and the USOA' 44 claim that
the process is confidential. IOA Standards also provide that confidentiality
may, at the ombudsman's discretion, be maintained even in the face of a

waiver. 145
The term "confidential" generally refers to information that is the
subject of efforts to keep it secret from others.146 As the court in Hofmann
Corp. v. Superior Court has said, "[o]rdinarily information which is relevant
' 147
to the subject matter of a lawsuit and not privileged is discoverable."
Hofrann notes that protection is given to banking and other sensitive
148 and to trade secrets. 149
financial information,
In contrast to privileged information, confidential information is subject
to discovery, although the California courts may impose a higher standard
for discovery, and deny discovery of information that is only marginally
relevant.' 50
However, such an approach is confined to "protecting

142. See IOA Standards of Practice, supranote 93, at § 3.2.
143. See id. at § 3.1.
144. See Government Ombudsman Standards, supra note 100, at § (A)(8)(d)-(c).
145. IOA Standard 3.1 provides, in part:
The Ombudsman holds all communications with those seeking assistance in strict confidence and
takes all reasonable steps to safeguard confidentiality, including the following: The Ombudsman
does not disclose confidential communications unless given permission to do so in the course of
informal discussions with the Ombudsman, and even then at the sole discretion of the Ombudsman;
the Ombudsman does not reveal, and must not be required to reveal, the identity of any individual
contacting the Ombudsman Office, nor does the Ombudsman reveal information provided in
confidence that could lead to the identification of any individual contacting the Ombudsman Office,
without that individual's express permission... (emphasis added).
IOA Standards of Practice, supra note 93, at § 3.1.
146. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 318 (8th ed. 2004).
147. Hofmann Corp. v. Superior Court, 172 Cal. App. 3d 357, 362 (Ct. App. 1985).
148. Burkle v. Burkle, 135 Cal. App. 4th 1045, 1064 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing Valley Bank of
Nevada v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652, 656 (1975)).
149. In calling trade secrets "confidential," Hofmann confuses that concept with privilege,
which refers to a right not to disclose information. See generally Fred C. Zacharias, Harmonizing
Privilege and Confidentiality, 41 S. TEx. L. REv. 69, 71-75 (1999). A qualified privilege is
conferred on trade secrets by CAL. EVID. CODE § 1060 (West 2006).
150. Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 4th 1481, 1492 (2006).

132
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particularly sensitive matters, such as sexual or psychiatric histories, or the
privacy interests of third parties.""5 '
There is little California authority regarding the confidentiality of the
ombudsman process. California Welfare and Institutions Code section 9725
provides that complainants' communications to a long-term care
ombudsman are confidential.1 52 But the complainant may waive this
protection, disclosure may be made to law enforcement agencies, and the
courts may order discovery.
This conditional, complainant-held

confidentiality is not the near-absolute,
ombudsman-controlled protection
153

that IOA Standard 3.1 envisions.
The only other California statute mentioning the confidentiality of
ombudsman communications is Penal Code section 2641, which simply
provides without explanation that prison officials shall allow inmates to
write confidential letters to the Sexual Abuse in Detention Elimination
Ombudsperson. 5 4 No case discusses section 2641.
In fact, no California or Ninth Circuit case has held that communication
with an ombudsman is per se confidential. 55 Even Garstang v. Superior
Court, which denied discovery of statements made to a corporate
ombudsman, did not extend confidentiality in this way. 156 Garstang's
holding rested on the existence of a confidentiality agreement, on the
revelation of private information to the ombudsman by university

151. Id.at 1492.
152. California Welfare and Institutions Code section 9725 provides:
All records and files of the office relating to any complaint or investigation made
pursuant to this chapter and the identities of complainants, witnesses, patients, or
residents shall remain confidential, unless disclosure is authorized by the patient or
resident or his or her conservator of the person or legal representative, required by court
order, or release of the information is to a law enforcement agency, public protective
service agency, licensing or certification agency in a manner consistent with federal laws
and regulations.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 9725 (West 2007). For a 2007 case analyzing this section and limiting
consent-based disclosure to the consenting patient's records and court-ordered disclosure to cases in
which such disclosure is "necessary to enforce the provisions of the State Ombudsman law ...or
when a party's compelling need for discovery outweighs the fundamental interest in maintaining the
confidentiality of the ombudsman's records," see Ombudsman Serv. of N. Cal., 154 Cal. App. 4th at
1248.
153. See HAW. REv. STAT. § 96-9 (LexisNexis 2006).
154. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2641(b) (West 2007).
155. One Ninth Circuit case has described a meeting with a university ombudsman regarding
sexual harassment as 'confidential', but the opinion does not discuss the issue, and cites no authority
in support of this dictum. See Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech, 339 F.3d 1158, 1165 ( 9 th Cir, 2003).
156. Garstang v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. App. 4th 526 (1995).
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employees, 57 and on promises of confidentiality by university officials.5 8
It did not rest on the confidentiality per se of communications with the
ombudsman. Had there been no disclosure of private information and no
confidentiality agreement, Garstangwould have been decided differently.
This conclusion is bolstered by the opinion in Saeta v. Superior
Court.5 9 In Saeta, the court refused to follow Garstang where there were
no demonstrated privacy concerns. 160
Because not every case will

encompass privacy issues, the blanket claims of confidentiality made by the
IOA are insupportable, notwithstanding Garstang.

Furthermore, the IOA's assertion that confidentiality will be maintained
even where there is a waiver has no legal basis. Where confidentiality has

157. The Court in Ombudsman Service of Northern Californiatakes a similar approach. There,
the Third District of the California Court of Appeal relied on Garstang'sprivacy analysis to strike
down a court's discovery order, which had allowed broad discovery of a long-term healthcare
ombudsman's statutorily-privileged records. The Court did so without a showing that some
compelling need justified disregarding both the statutory privilege and the patients' very strong
privacy interests. See Ombudsman Serv. of N. Cal., 154 Cal. App. 4th at 466-69.
158. See Garstang,39 Cal. App. 4th at 533-35.
159. See Saeta v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 4th 273 (Ct. App. 2004).
160. The Saeta court said:
Relying on Garstang, petitioner argues he is protected by the California Constitution's
qualified privilege. He acknowledges California does not recognize an ombudsperson
privilege, but argues the state recognizes the importance of alternative dispute resolution
and deems communications made in mediation to be protected. We conclude, under the
facts of this case, petitioner does not enjoy the qualified privilege set forth in article 1,
section one of the California Constitution. Evidence provided by [real party in interest]
Dent reveals that the information she sought from petitioner does not relate to the private
affairs of any other employees... Moreover, there is no showing the parties here
anticipated the sessions before the review board would be confidential. Unlike Garstang,
the parties here did not sign a confidentiality agreement. [The employer] made no
representations that the review board hearing would be held in confidence. Moreover,
others who had been present at Dent's review board hearing have already testified in
depositions without invoking a privilege or a right to privacy. As petitioner observed, the
Legislature has clearly and unequivocally expressed its espousal of alternative dispute
resolution, underscoring its support by insisting on confidentiality that applies to the
parties to mediation as well as to the mediator. However, the record shows that the parties
proceeded without the expectation that what was said or occurred during the review
board hearing was confidential. The parties' right to privacy in this case is outweighed by
Dent's need for discovery to facilitate the effort to ascertain the truth. Accordingly, the
privilege embodied in the right to privacy is inapplicable here.
We hold the trial court did not err in granting Dent's motion to compel petitioner's
deposition testimony because the testimony being sought is not protected by either the
privileges of Evidence Code sections 703.5 and 1119, or by the right to privacy contained
in article 1, section 1 of the California Constitution.
Saeta, 117 Cal. App. 4 th at 273-74.
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been waived, both testimony16' and discovery 162 regarding the previously
confidential topic may be compelled.
E. The Refusal to Testify
IOA Standard 3.3 expressly provides that members shall refuse to testify
in internal organizational hearings, and shall "resist" testifying in court, even
if other participants request his or her testimony. 63 The first part of this
standard need not concern us. While it may cause the ombudsman trouble at
work, there are no legal barriers to complying with it.
For purposes of this discussion, I will assume that at least some
ombudsmen would interpret the instruction to "resist" testifying in court to
require an outright refusal. Such an assumption makes sense if one accepts
the other premises of the IOA Standards - that the ombudsman holds a
privilege, and that proceedings before him shall remain confidential even in
the event of a waiver. 164
This assumption is also supported by the IOA's Code of Ethics, which
states unequivocally that the ombudsman "does not participate in any formal
or informal adjudicative or 65
administrative procedure related to concerns
brought to his/her attention."1
This ethical standard is in direct conflict with the principle that "the
public has a right... to every man's evidence."1 66 Only a privilege not to
testify will overcome this principle. 167 As we have seen, California does not
recognize such a privilege for ombudsmen,168 and its viability in the federal
courts is extremely questionable. 169 Therefore, an ombudsman who refuses
to testify in these forums faces contempt penalties. 7 0

161. Agnew v. Superior Court, 156 Cal. App. 2d 838, 841(Ct. App. 1958); Olam v. Cong.
Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1134-35 (N.D. Cal 1999).
162. Wilson v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. App. 3d 825, 830 (Ct. App. 1976); Jack Winter, Inc. v.
Koratron Co., 54 F.R.D. 44, 47 (N.D. Cal 1971).
163. See supranotes 93, 96.
164. See generally 1OA Standards of Practice, supra note 93.
165. See IOA Code of Ethics, supranote 91.
166. Roman Catholic Archbishop of L.A. v. Superior Court, 131 Cal. App. 4th 417, 438 (Ct.
App. 2005); Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 674.
167. 131 Cal. App. at 438; 408 U.S. at 674.
168. Saeta, 117 Cal. App.4th 261.
169. See supranotes 128-39 and accompanying text.
170. See infra, notes 171-83 and accompanying text (discussing these penalties).
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The case of Branzburg v. Hayes is instructive regarding the obligation to
testify. 7' Paul Branzburg, a reporter, was held in contempt for refusing to
disclose confidential informant identities to a grand jury. 71'2 His refusal was
based in part on the published ethical standards of the American Newspaper
Guild, which forbade such revelations. 171
The United States Supreme Court upheld the conviction, saying:
Citizens generallv are not constitutionallv immune from grand iurv
subnoenas: and neither the First Amendment nor anv other
constitutional nrovision nrotects the average citizen from disclosing
to a grand jury information that he has received in confidence.. .No
oledee of privacy nor oath of secrecy can avail against demand for the truth in a court of
justice. 17

F. PenaltiesJbr Contempt
The parallel between an ombudsman who adheres strictly to IOA ethical
standards and the unfortunate Mr. Branzburg is exact. An ombudsman who
felt ethically compelled not to recognize a waiver, or otherwise refused to
testify or provide discovery about communications from participants,
would
176
75
likely suffer a contempt citation from either a California1 or a Federal
court.

Of course, an ombudsman might choose to suffer punishment for
contempt in defense of his or her beliefs, just as reporters sometimes choose
incarceration to protect their sources.177 But such a choice should be made
only with full awareness of the potential adverse consequences.
The consequences may be severe. In California, one guilty of contempt
may be fined up to $1,000 or incarcerated for up to five days, or both. 178 He
may also be required to pay attorneys' fees related to the contempt

171. See generally Branzburg,408 U.S. 665.
172. Id. at 709.
173. Id. at 732 n.10 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 683.
175. See People v. Cloyd, 54 Cal. App. 4"h 1402, 1408 (1997) (refusal to testify as contempt);
see In re de ]a Parra 184 Cal. App. 3d 139, 143 (Ct. App. 1986) (refusal to obey discovery order as
contempt).
176. See Aradia Women's Health Ctr. v. Operation Rescue, 929 F.2d 530, 533 (9th Cir. 1991)
(refusal to testify as contempt); see Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1389-90 (9th Cir. 1978)
(refusal to obey discovery order as contempt).
177. Recently, Judith Miller of the New York Times was held in contempt for refusing to
disclose the content of her conversations with then-vice-presidential chief-of-staff I. Lewis "Scooter"
Libby, Jr. about the "outing" of former CIA agent Valerie Plame. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena,
Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
178. CAL. CIV. P. CODE § 1218(a) (West 2006).

136

https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol8/iss1/4

20

Van Soye: Illusory Ethics: Legal Barriers to an Ombudsman's Compliance with

[Vol. 8: 1, 2007]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

proceeding.179 Finally, he may be imprisoned until he complies with the
order, or the court determines that he will not do so. 180
Under federal law, the punishment for contempt may likewise include
both fines and imprisonment.' 8 ' As in California, 8 2 fines for a criminal
contempt may not exceed $1,000.183 However, a conviction for 4federal
criminal contempt may result in imprisonment for up to six months. 1
If the contempt is civil, a federal court may assess fines in whatever
185
amount it deems necessary to compensate for actual losses sustained,
including the cost to federal taxpayers of the contempt prosecution. 8 6 The
federal civil contemnor may8 7be imprisoned until he complies, or the court

determines he cannot do

so.1

G. Recordkeeping and Document Destruction
IOA Standards provide that the ombudsman shall keep no records
identifying complainants "on behalf of the organization," ' 8 and shall keep
all records secure, even from management. 189 Further, such records are to
be subject to a consistent document destruction policy. 190
Keeping no identifying records may not be practical, as some records
must be maintained during the process, if only to refresh the ombudsman's
Further, as Ziegenfuss notes, corporate ombudsmen are
recollection.
sometimes required to generate reports regarding the facts of a case, which
may include the names of witnesses or potential witnesses. ' 9' For someone
179. Id.
180. In re Farr, 36 Cal. App. 3d 577, 583-84 (Ct. App. 1974).
181. 18 U.S.C.A. § 402 (2006).
182. See CAL. CIV. P. CODE § 1218(a) (West 2006); see generally Roman Catholic Archbishop
of L.A., 131 Cal. App. 417; see also Branzburg,408 U.S. at 665.
183. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 402 (2006); supra notes 128-39 and accompanying text.
184. See id.
185. In re Maurice, 73 F.3d 124, 127-28 (7th Cir. 1995).
186. In re Jaques, 761 F.2d 302, 306 (6th Cir. 1985).
187. Chadwick v. Janecka, 302 F.3d 107, 117 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that state court's denial of
habeas corpus petition to contemnor confined indefinitely for period then totaling, seven years was
not unreasonable application of federal law).
188. See IOA Standards of Practice, supra note 93 at § 3.5. As previously noted, the
governmental ombudsmen of the USOA do not have similar standards. See generally Cook &
Gronke, supra note 2.
189. See IOA Standards of Practice, supra note 93 at § 3.6.
190. See id.
191. See ZIEGENFUSS, supra note 71, at 116.
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with enough knowledge of the corporation, it would not be hard to track
down the complainant's identity, even if his or her name is not mentioned in
the report or has been redacted.
Finally, Oser points out that keeping information from management may
create conflicts of interest between the internal corporate ombudsman and
the corporation.1 92
One litigation-related conflict is described by
Ziegenfuss, who recounts that his company's lawyers wanted to rebut a
charge that the corporation had no complaint process by describing the
plaintiffs visit to the ombudsman.' 93 An ombudsman's records might also
establish when a statute of limitations began to run, or reveal prior
inconsistent statements made to the ombudsman.
Despite these tensions and conflicts, there is normally no legal
requirement that records of a corporate ombudsman's activities be created.
But the situation might well be different for certain regulated businesses.
For example, California physicians are required to keep "adequate and
194
accurate records relating to the provision of services to their patients."'
While there is no authority on the subject, if a physician or medical group
hired an ombudsman to resolve complaints, his or her files could constitute
"records relating to the provision of services," which must therefore be
maintained.
Similarly, insurance companies must maintain claim files containing all
documents that "reasonably pertain to each claim."' 195
Further, the
destruction of documents - or a policy of not creating them in the first place
in order to avoid their introduction in litigation - has been held to justify a
finding of bad faith. 196 So if an ombudsman were used in the claims context,
the failure to keep records, or the decision to destroy documents, in
accordance with IOA Standards 3.5 and 3.6, could be unlawful.' 97
The issue of document destruction is a sensitive one.
Federal
obstruction-of-justice statutes criminalize the destruction of evidence known
to be relevant to a pending or likely federal judicial proceeding. '" A preexisting document destruction policy will not necessarily immunize such
conduct. 199

192. See Oser, supra note 72, at 296-97.
193. See ZIEGENFUSS, supra note 71, at 116.
194. CAL. Bus. & PROF'L CODE § 2266 (West 2007).
195. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10 § 2695.3 (2003).
196. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 435 (2003).
197. See IOA Standards of Practice, supra note 93 at §§ 3.5, 3.6.
198. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1503, 1519 (West 2007).
199. Christopher R. Chase, To Shred or Not to Shred: Document Retention Policies and
FederalObstruction of Justice Statutes, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 721, at 729-35 (2003).

138

https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol8/iss1/4

22

Van Soye: Illusory Ethics: Legal Barriers to an Ombudsman's Compliance with

[Vol. 8: 1, 2007]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

Ombudsman records could be "relevant" under sections 1503 and 1519
if the complainant was dissatisfied with the informal resolution process and
filed litigation over the same issues.20 0
California law is less expansive; it prohibits the knowing destruction of
evidence that is "about to be produced in evidence upon any trial, inquiry, or
investigation whatever, authorized by law."20 ' There are also civil penalties
for such destruction (or "spoliation") of evidence in litigation. They include
the possibility that the court will draw a negative inference from the
destruction of the ombudsman's records, or impose discovery sanctions on
the corporation.20 2 Under Federal law, spoliation of evidence may be
grounds for a similar negative inference, or even a new trial on the ground of
fraud.203
Clearly, if the court does not find the corporation's document
destruction policy to be valid, the IOA's Standards on this topic can lead to
serious consequences for both the ombudsman and the corporation.20 4
H. Notice to the Ombudsman as Notice to the Corporation
IOA Standard 4.8 provides that the ombudsman shall not serve as the
organization's agent.20 5 What this standard fails to recognize is that agency
is not always the choice of the agent. For example, some corporations give
their ombudsmen exalted titles, perhaps to ease their relations with other
managers. 206 But this practice may mean that service of process on the
ombudsman is service on the corporation, despite any statements to the
contrary.
California law provides that service on the corporation is effective if it is
made on an agent for service or on "the president, chief executive officer, or
other head of the corporation, a vice president, a secretary or assistant
secretary, a treasurer or assistant treasurer, a controller or chief financial
officer, a general manager, or a person authorized by the corporation to

200. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1503, 1519 (West 2007).
201. CAL. PENAL CODE § 135 (West 2007).
202. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 4th 1, 12-13 (1998); CAL. EVID. CODE
§413 (West 2007); CAL. CIV. P. CODE § 2023.030 (West 2007).
203. Chase, supra note 199, at 722 n.7 and accompanying text (citing FED. R. Civ P. 60(b)(3)).
204. See supra notes 188-203 and accompanying text.
205. See IOA Standards of Practice, supra note 93, at § 4.8.
206. See Futter, supra note 79, at 76-77.
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,,207

receive service of process.
That is, giving the ombudsman any of these
positions automatically authorizes his receipt of the summons.
IOA Standard 4.8 also asserts "notice to the ombudsman is not notice to
the organization. 20 8 The ABA Standards also provide that notice to the
ombudsman should not be imputed to the organization.2 °9
The notice-to-the-organization issue raised by Standard 4.8 is likely to
arise where a report of sexual harassment is made to the ombudsman.2 1 °
Under Title VII, a corporation is liable for sexual harassment by plaintiffs
coworkers or by non-employees where "its agents or supervisory employees
knows or should have known" of the harassment,
and fails to take
' 211
"immediate and appropriate corrective action.
Notice to management-level employees constitutes notice to the
corporation in both the Ninth Circuit2 t 2 and California. 213 Giving the
ombudsman an officer's title 21 4 is therefore likely to result in imputed notice
to the corporation where a complainant discloses sexual harassment. 215
The American Bar Association's revised 2004 Standards for the
Establishment and Operations of Ombuds Offices do not address the effect
of a practitioner's position within the organization on the notice issue. They
do, however, point out that the ombudsman's communications with
management can result in notice to the organization, especially where2 16the
information is specific, or indicates a pattern of widespread wrongdoing.
To minimize the possibility that notice to the ombudsman will be treated
as notice to his or her employer, the ombudsman should be given power

(West 2007).

207.

CAL CIV. P. CODE. § 416.10(b)

208.

See IOA Standards of Practice, supra note 93, at § 4.8.

209.

See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 18 at Standard F(3).
210. 29 C.F.R § 1604.11 (d)-(e) (2007).
211. Id.
212. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 881 (9th Cir. 1991).
213. Birschtien v. New United Motor Mfg., Inc., 92 Cal. App. 4th 994, 1007 (Ct. App. 2001).
214. See Futter, supra note 79, at 76-77.
215. See Bonnie Belson Edwards & John H. Mason, Sexual Harassment Investigation: How
Far Can You Go? in Mass. Cont. Legal Educ., Inc., 2 DISCRIMINATION AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT
2007, §14.12.2 (a). Even if the ombudsmen is not part of management, one commentary has argued:
[T]he notion that a complaint to a designated "ombudsman" does not constitute "notice"
to the employer for purposes of responding to claims of sexual harassment-even if it
means disclosing the identity of the complaining individual-is of uncertain legal
standing.
Obviously, this would hinge upon a court (or better yet, a legislature)
recognizing ombudsman "privilege."

Id.
216. Judy Kaleta & John Barkett, The ABA Ombuds Standards: Advancing an Important
Profession, II DISPUTE RESOL. MAG. 9 (WINTER 2005); see also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
supra note 18 at Standard F(2).
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within the organization, and access to senior management, without making
him or her an officer or member of senior management.
An ombudsman may also unwillingly become an agent through other
conduct. If the organization, through its lack of ordinary care, leads a third
party to a reasonable belief that the ombudsman is its agent, and that party
relies on her belief, the ombudsman will be treated as an agent.2" 7 This is
known as "ostensible agency," and could make the ombudsman an agent of
the corporation despite Standard 4.8.18 A finding of ostensible agency
requires "reasonable reliance" on facts leading one to believe in the
ombudsman's agency. 219 Express representations that the ombudsman is not
an agent could render such reliance unreasonable, though there is no case on
point.
L Other Paths to Ethical Practice- Applicable Privilegesand Useful
Practices
Although strict compliance with the published ethical standards may
result in penalties once litigation begins, there are other doctrines and modes
of practice that could allow an ombudsman to preserve the confidentiality of
communications 220
and the neutrality of his office. These strategies are
discussed below.
1. Confidentiality agreements
Garstang22 I and Saeta,221 supra, indicate that confidentiality agreements
may be the key to maintaining the secrecy of proceedings where the
information to be disclosed to the ombudsman is not otherwise private.
Breach of such an agreement gives rise to an action for damages. Its
existence will also lead the court to apply a higher standard to discovery
requests.223

217. Mejia v. Cmty. Hosp. of San Bernardino, 99 Cal. App. 4th 1448, 1453 (Ct. App. 2002);
see also CAL. CIV. CODE §2317 (West 2007).
218. Id. at 1453.
219. Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal. 2d 412, 451-52 (1945).
220. See infra notes 220-50 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
222. See id.
223. Jack H. Friedenthal, Secrecy in Civil Litigation:Discovery and Party Agreements, 9 J. L.
& POL'Y 67, 76-77 (2000).
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This higher standard arises from the fact that "communications made
under a guarantee of confidentiality are "manifestly within the Constitution's
protected area of privacy., 224 The privacy privilege thus applies; but it is a
conditional privilege. It will be disregarded when (1) the information sought
is directly relevant to the action, and (2) there is a "compelling public need"
for the discovery that outweighs the privacy interest advanced.2

If this difficult test is not met, discovery will be denied.226 So by
ensuring that all participants enter into a confidentiality agreement,
ombudsmen can help secure the integrity of their process despite the
existence of related litigation.
The Mediation Privilege

The USOA recognizes that mediating disputes is a valid part of an
ombudsman's function. 2 7 And while the IOA Standards do not address the

issue, organizational ombudsmen, like their educational brethren,2 28 often
mediate disputes.

229

Because both California law 230 and federal authority

recognize a mediation privilege, the ombudsman and process participants
may each maintain the confidentiality of mediation efforts and the
communications leading up to them. 23' For example, California's statute
provides that no statement or document "made for the purpose of, in the

course of, or pursuant to, a mediation or a mediation consultation" is
admissible or discoverable. 32

Mediation need not be formally designated as such. It is defined as "a
process in which a neutral person or persons facilitate communication
between the disputants to assist them in reaching a mutually acceptable

agreement. 233
Because a mediator is simply "a neutral person who conducts a
mediation," or an assistant to such a person, the ombudsman need not have

any special qualifications in order for his conflict resolution efforts to
224. Bd. ofTrs. v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 3d. 516, 527 (1981).
225. Garstang,39 Cal. App. 4th at 533-34; Bd. of Trustees, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 527-28.
226. Garstang,39 Cal. App. 4th at 533-34; Bd. of Trustees, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 527-28.
227. See Government Ombudsman Standards, supra note 100, at § II (D)(2)(b); see also Mills,
supra note 56 (a description of the City of Portland, Oregon's mediation program, which was
designed to resolve complaints concerning the police department).
228. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
229. See ZIEGENFUSS, supra note 71, at 25, 38-39; see also Hill, supra note 58. Hill refers to
corporate ombudsmen (somewhat disparagingly) as "mediator ombudsmen." Id.
230. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1119 (West 2007); In re Marriage of Kieturakis, 138 Cal. App. 4th 56,
85-86 (2006).
231. See FED. R. EVID. §§ 408, 501; see also Folb v. Motion Picture Indust. Pension & Health
Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d. 1164, 1171-72 (C.D. Cal 1998).
232. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1119 (West 2007).
233. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1115(a) (West 2007).
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qualify as privileged.234

The mediation privilege belongs to the neutral

ombudsman as well as to the disputants,
235 so it can be maintained by him or
her even if one of the parties waives it.
Although the Garstang court denied application of the mediation
privilege to an ombudsman's efforts, it did so only because the then-required
written mediation agreement had not been signed.236 Garstang therefore

does not bar application of the mediation privilege to an ombudsman's

dispute resolution efforts.237
The ombudsman also has a limited privilege not to testify about his acts
as a mediator. The privilege does not apply to related contempt, criminal,
disqualification or disciplinary proceedings.2 3
Although California defines mediation broadly enough to encompass

many types of dispute resolution facilitation, including a process in which
the parties never meet face to face,239 the courts would seem to be most
likely to apply the privilege when a traditional mediation session has taken
place. There are, however, no cases on point.
2. The Self-critical Analysis Privilege
Another doctrine that has the potential to shield aspects of the
ombudsman's work is the self-critical analysis privilege, which protects
voluntary self-evaluative reports aimed at determining an entity's

234. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1115(b) (West 2007).
235. See Olam v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1130-31 (applying California law).
236. See Garstang, 39 Cal. App. 4th at 531; see also CAL. EVID. CODE § 1152.5(c) (repealed
1997). The statute that required a written agreement was repealed in 1997. Id.
237. See Garstang,39 Cal. App. 4th at 531.
238. CAL. EVID. CODE § 703.5 (West 2007). The statute provides:
No person presiding at any judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, and no arbitrator or
mediator, shall be competent to testify, in any subsequent civil proceeding, as to any
statement, conduct, decision, or ruling, occurring at or in conjunction with the prior
proceeding, except as to a statement or conduct that could (a) give rise to civil or criminal
contempt, (b) constitute a crime, (c) be the subject of investigation by the State Bar or
Commission on Judicial Performance, or (d) give rise to disqualification proceedings
under paragraph (1) or (6) of subdivision (a) of Section 170.1 of the Code of Civil
Procedure...
Id.
239. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
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compliance with legal or regulatory requirements.24 0 Ombudsmen are
frequently involved in such analyses.2 4'
In order for the privilege to apply, three criteria must be met:
[F]irst, the information must result from a critical self-analysis
undertaken by the party seeking protection; second, the public must have a
strong interest in preserving the free flow of the type of information sought;
finally, the information must be of the type whose flow would be curtailed if
discovery were allowed. 42
For example, a corporate ombudsman's report to directors regarding
ongoing complaints of unsafe practices could be covered by the privilege.
There is a public interest in such reports, because they increase awareness of
problems, and allow the corporation to take corrective steps. 243 Further, a
corporation might well be reluctant to allow such analyses if they could be
used in court.California does not recognize the critical self-analysis
privilege, for which there is no statutory basis. 244 Further, it has not yet been
recognized by the Ninth Circuit. 245 Although the current usefulness of the
self-critical analysis privilege is therefore doubtful, its recognition is still
possible, given the case-by-case approach taken under Rule 501, and
practitioners may wish to claim it in appropriate circumstances.246
3. The Deliberative Process Privilege
In California, the deliberative process privilege protects "not only the
mental processes by which a given decision was reached, but the substance
of conversations, discussions, debates, deliberations and like materials
reflecting advice, opinions, and recommendations
by which government
' 247
policy is processed and formulated.
The privilege has also been accepted by the federal courts, so an
ombudsman whose recommendations and discussions lead to changes in
policy may rely on the deliberative process to protect communications with
other participants.24 8

240. Reichhold Chem., Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 522, 524 (N.D.Fla. 1994).
241. Brenda v. Thompson, Note, Corporate Ombudsmen and Privileged Communications:
Should Employee Communications to CorporateOmbudsman Be Entitled to Privilege? 61 U. CIN. L.
REV. 653, 668-69 (1992).
242. Note, The Privilege ofSelf-CriticalAnalysis, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1083, at p. 1086 (1983).
243. See Wylie v. Mills, 195 N.J. Super. 332, 337-40 (1984).
244. Cloud v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. App. 4th 1552, 1557-58 (Ct. App. 1996).
245. Dowling v. Am. Haw. Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 473, 476 (9th Cir. 1992).
246. See Kientzy, 133 F.R.D at 571-73.
247. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 4th 509, 540 (1999).
248. Carter v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 307 F.3d 1084, 1090 (9th Cir. 2002).
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4. Lowering the Risk of Sanctions for Document Destruction
As noted above, document destruction policies carry with them a risk of
liability for obstruction of justice and spoliation of evidence.249
Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has recognized the validity
of such policies, which are widely used in business.25 ° But to be valid, the
policy must be communicated to all employees, be routine, and be
consistently applied.2 5 It cannot be selective in its scope or enforcement.
252
Therefore, compliance should be monitored on an ongoing basis.
And the retention periods in the policy must be reasonable. One Nevada
decision held that destruction of incident reports before the relevant statute
of limitations has run justifies an adverse inference that the reports would
have been unfavorable.253
Once it becomes apparent that litigation may be filed, a litigation "hold"
must be placed on related document destruction, including any automatic
deletion protocols related to electronic data. The failure to do so may well
result in liability for obstruction of justice, even though the otherwise-neutral
policy calls for destruction at the same time litigation
document-retention
25 4
becomes likely.

IV. TIPS FOR MOVING

FORWARD

The IOA's published ethical standards are surely a trap for the unwary.
They could result in serious legal consequences for an ethical
ombudsman. 55 But by keeping the following tips in mind, the ethical
ombudsman can maximize the integrity of the process, while minimizing
unacceptable legal risks:
Neither California nor the Ninth Circuit currently recognizes an
ombudsman privilege. 56 But the routine execution of confidentiality

249. See supra notes 188-204 and accompanying text.
250. Arthur Andersen v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 704 (2005).
251. Peter Brown, Discovery and Use of Electronic Evidence, in 797 PRACTISING L. INST. 447
(June 2004).
252. See id.
253. Reingold v. Wet 'N Wild Nev., Inc., 113 Nev. 967 (1997) (overruled in part by Bass-Davis
v. Davis, 122 Nev. 422 (2006)).
254. See United States v. Quattrone, 441 F.3d. 153 (2nd Cir. 2006).
255. See generally IOA Standards of Practice, supranote 93.
256. See supra notes 141-63 and accompanying text.
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agreements will decrease the likelihood of disclosure, especially if the
information revealed to the ombudsman is generally regarded as personal.
The ombudsman should avoid being assigned other management
responsibilities, or being designated as an officer of the corporation.
Otherwise, notice to him or her will likely be treated as notice to the
organization.1 57 Further, the ombudsman should expressly notify process
participants that he or she is not the agent of the corporation. Such
notification could well defeat a claim of ostensible agency, by drastically
weakening the element of reasonable reliance, which is necessary to a
finding of agency on this theory.258
When the ombudsman attempts to resolve disputes, he or she should
model those efforts on a traditional mediation session, rather than
accomplishing the same results by phone or letter. While no doubt
mediation will be more time consuming than other methods, it will
maximize the chance that the mediation privilege will be applied, along with
the related testimonial privilege conferred by California Evidence Code
section 703.5.259
A legislative or executive ombudsman's contributions to policy change
are probably protected by the deliberative process privilege, which should be
claimed. 260 But the law is unlikely to shield a corporate practitioner's
analogous efforts, because the self-critical analysis privilege has not been
recognized by California or the Ninth Circuit. Nevertheless, because of the
case by case approach taken by the federal courts, a claim that an
ombudsman's work is a privileged self-critical analysis could succeed in
federal litigation.
While generally an ombudsman has no duty to maintain records, this
may not be true in heavily-regulated industries, or where a government
entity is involved. 26' A wise ombudsman will become thoroughly familiar
with the organization's recordkeeping obligations. If records are kept, they
should be retained for a reasonable time, subject to a routine, universallyapplied document destruction policy. This policy must be put on hold when
litigation becomes likely.
Adopting these few changes will maximize the necessary confidentiality
of the process while minimizing the adverse consequences to the ethical
ombudsman.

257.

See supra notes 205-19 and accompanying text.

258.
259.
260.

See supra notes 205-19 and accompanying text.
See CAL. EVID. CODE § 703.5,supra note 237.
See supra notes 247-48 and accompanying text.

261.

See State ex rel. Strothers v. Wertheim, 80 Ohio St. 3d 155, 157-58 (1997) (reports to

county ombudsman are subject to disclosure under the Ohio Public Records Act).
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